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Abstract
The author asserts that adherence to the rule of law, including property law, is a
necessary condition to economic development and human freedom. United States
governmental agencies and private institutes have attempted to convey this mes-
sage to Russia, other states of the former Soviet Union, and former Soviet satellite
states, with some success. Finally, and unfortunately, the United States has veered
away from the very adherence to the rule of law respecting property which it es-
pouses abroad.
 Private Property, Development and Freedom: On Taking Our Own Advice 
By Steven J. Eagle*
Abstract 
The author asserts that adherence to the rule of law, including property law, is a necessary con-
dition to economic development and human freedom. United States governmental agencies and 
private institutes have attempted to convey this message to Russia, other states of the former So-
viet Union, and former Soviet satellite states, with some success. Finally, and unfortunately, the 
United States has veered away from the very adherence to the rule of law respecting property 
which it espouses abroad. 
 
During the past 15 years, the United States government and private American founda-
tions have given considerable advice to the governments of Russia, other republics comprising 
the former Soviet Union, and Eastern European nations emerging from behind the former Iron 
Curtain. A good deal of this counsel reiterates the theme that a robust set of private property 
rights in land is indispensable to individual freedom and economic prosperity. This article ex-
plores such suggestions by American governmental and private organizations and contrasts them 
with contrary governmental practices here in the United States. 
As economic and foreign policy makers have discovered, meaningful legal protection for 
private property cannot be imposed by sovereign fiat, or imparted whole through the generosity 
of eleemosynary foundations. Instead, secure property rights arise as citizens come to enjoy the 
benefits of private ownership and develop trust that their governments see such rights as legiti-
mate and inviolate. This, in turn, requires supportive legal and social institutions. 
In nations gaining a measure of political freedom, the immediate need is for nurturing an 
institutional structure upon which property rights are based. In the United States, on the other 
hand, the need is to build upon a long tradition of private property and freedom, and to resist the 
temptation to achieve short-run governmental objectives at the cost of weakening individual 
rights.  
                                                 
* Professor of Law, George Mason University, Arlington, Virginia (seagle@gmu.edu). The author wishes to 
thank Bryan Kirchner, a third-year student at George Mason, for his very helpful research assistance.  
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I. THE RULE OF LAW, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
In developing and developed nations alike, the predicates for individual liberty and na-
tional wealth are the rule of law and private property rights. The rule of law, in itself, is a neces-
sary but insufficient condition for either liberty or prosperity. 
A. The Rule of Law as a Framework for Rights 
The most essential aspect of the rule of law is that government is bound in all its actions 
by rules determined and articulated in advance.1 It thus is distinguished from regimes in which 
the leader’s whim must be obeyed. While this type of rule sometimes is characterized as “char-
ismatic,” history teaches that the better characterization is “despotic.”2
Among the more specific attributes generally associated with the rule of law are: (1) ca-
pacity (rules must be able to guide people in their affairs); (2) efficacy (rules actually do serve to 
guide people); (3) stability (the rule must be reasonably stable so that people can plan and coor-
dinate their actions over time); (4) supremacy of legal authority (the law should rule officials, 
including judges, as well as ordinary citizens); and (5) impartiality (courts should enforce the law 
and use fair procedures).3
While the rule of law thus provides for procedural fairness and, at least to some extent, 
shields individuals from abrupt changes in existing rules, it does not necessarily establish norms 
for the substantive rules themselves. Indeed, there is a long history of debate about whether 
“law” must be grounded in substantive norms at all. Those adhering to the positivist school of 
                                                 
1 See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72-73 (1944). 
2 The “leader principle,” in German, Führerprinzip, was at the heart of Nazi rule. “Nazi legal theory officially 
was that the Volk [people] defined the Führer [leader], but the practical power hierarchies fully contemplated 
by legal theorists writing after Hitler's stranglehold on political power meant that the Führer was to define the 
Volk, and not vice versa.” Vivian Grosswald Curran, Fear of Formalism: Indications from the Fascist Period 
in France and Germany of Judicial Methodology’s Impact on Substantive Law, 35 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 101, 
174 (2002). Recall also Lord Acton’s admonition, “[p]ower tends to corrupt; absolute power corrupts abso-
lutely.” Letter from Lord Acton, to Bishop Mandell Creighton (1887). 
3 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 8-9 (1997). 
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law maintain that the existence of “law” is not premised on moral notions,4 and is nothing more 
than the authoritative proscription of the sovereign, the person habitually obeyed.5 This perspec-
tive is open to, among other criticisms, the inference that it lends legitimacy to tyrannical re-
gimes.6 Partly for this reason, those adhering to the natural law school maintain that “law” must 
embody some minimal substantive content of fairness.7
B. Positive Law Approaches 
The rise of positivism can be traced to Thomas Hobbes’s assertion that the sole source of 
law is the absolute power of the sovereign.8 As he famously put it, the life of man in a state of 
nature was “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”9 Hobbes argued that men formed a social 
contract to establish order and safety and to escape the misery of the “war of all against all.”10 
Constrained by necessity, they entrusted their safety and property to the sovereign’s will.11  
Building upon Hobbes, Jeremy Bentham fashioned the theory of legal positivism that the 
noted legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin has described as the “ruling theory of law” in the 
United States and England.12 Bentham adopted as his conceptual or structural component that 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155, 185, 201 (2d ed. 1994) (asserting that legal positivism 
stands for “the simple contention that it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain 
demands of morality”). 
5 See, e.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 193-94 (1954) (1832) (noting that 
the maker of “law” is the person who the bulk of the population habitually obey and who habitually obeys no 
one else). 
6 See, e.g., Hans Kelsen’s observation about the forced labor, concentration camps, and murder authorized un-
der the Nazi regime: “Such measures may morally be violently condemned; but they cannot be considered as 
taking place outside the legal order . . . .” HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 40 (Mat Knight trans., 1967). 
7 See, e.g., John Finnis, Natural Law: the Classical Tradition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 
AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro, eds., 2002). 
8 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 80 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991) (1651). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 97. 
11 See generally, id., Parts I and II. 
12 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY vii, ix (1977). 
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“law” comes from the sovereign,13 and as his substantive or normative component the utilitarian 
principle of obtaining the “greatest good for the greatest number.”14 In more recent times, two of 
the most prominent legal positivists have been Hans Kelsen, who maintained that “a rule is a le-
gal rule because it provides for a sanction,”15 and H.L.A. Hart, who set forth a nuanced theory of 
rules that govern conduct and rules that govern the creation and application of rules.16
C. Natural Law Approaches and Locke 
Unlike legal positivism, the natural law approach to liberty and property is based on the 
supposition of moral reasoning. In 1980, Justice Thurgood Marshall observed: 
The constitutional terms “life, liberty, and property” do not derive their meaning solely 
from the provisions of positive law. They have a normative dimension as well, establish-
ing a sphere of private autonomy which government is bound to respect. Quite serious 
constitutional questions might be raised if a legislature attempted to abolish certain cate-
gories of common-law rights in some general way. Indeed, our cases demonstrate that 
there are limits on governmental authority to abolish “core” common-law rights, includ-
ing rights against trespass, at least without a compelling showing of necessity or a provi-
sion for a reasonable alternative remedy.17 
                                                 
13 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 112 (C. K. Ogden ed. & Richard Hildreth trans., Har-
court, Brace and Co. 1931). “I cannot count upon the enjoyment of that which I regard as mine, except through 
the promise of the law which guarantees it to me. It is the law alone which permits me to forget my natural 
weakness. It is only through the protection of law that I am able to enclose a field, and to give myself up to its 
cultivation with the sure though distant hope of harvest.” Id. 
14 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns & 
H.L.A. Hart eds., Methuen 1982) (1789). 
15 HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 29 (1961). 
16 See generally, H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962) (Hart describes 
“law” as the union of primary rules (i.e., rules relating to conduct) and secondary rules (i.e., rules which “spec-
ify the ways in which the primary rules [of conduct] may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, 
varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined.”). 
17PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 93-94 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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Similarly, Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the Supreme Court, applied a natural 
law theory of property when he invoked “an essential principle: Individual freedom finds tangi-
ble expression in property rights.”18
As distinguished from Hobbes’ view that people had to entrust their fate to the sovereign, 
John Locke liberalized the notion of social contract, arguing that men had common sense and 
therefore could cooperate for the common good without living under the yoke of absolutism.19 
Locke, an English political philosopher, was the individual most influential in the development 
of the American understanding of property rights. His labor theory of value often is called the 
“labor-desert” theory, since he asserts that individuals deserve to own, and can appropriate, natu-
ral resources mixed with their own labor. 
Locke’s theory of appropriation is an element of a framework for understanding social re-
lations in an era of poverty, as well as for action in restructuring those relationships.20 Using tra-
ditional natural law language, Locke asserted that everyone enjoys an “equal right” or “a right in 
common . . .  [to] provide for their subsistence.”21 Thus the law of nature “gives every man a title 
to so much out of another’s plenty, as will keep him from extreme want, where he has not the 
means to subsist otherwise.”22 Based on passages of the Two Treatises condemning nonproduc-
tive dominion over property as waste,23 Richard Ashcraft concluded that “[p]roductive labor, and 
                                                 
18  United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993) (holding that absent exigent cir-
cumstances, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that the Government give notice and an 
opportunity to be heard prior to its seizure of real property subject to civil forfeiture). 
19 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 3 (J.W. Gough ed., 2d ed. 1956). 
20See Richard Ashcraft, Lockean Ideas, Poverty, and the Development of Liberal Political Theory, in EARLY 
MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY 43, 45 (John Brewer & Susan Staves eds., 1995). 
21 JOHN LOCKE, FIRST TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, pars 86-93; Second Treatise, par. 25. 
22JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, pars. 7, 16, 135, 171, 183; First Treatise, par. 42. 
23Locke maintained that “God commended” man to labor, “to subdue the earth, i.e., improve it for the benefit 
of life,” and that whoever “in obedience of this command of God, subdued, tilled and sowed any part of it” 
could claim the land as the product of his labor. Second Treatise, pars. 32, 35. But if an individual fenced off 
land without cultivating or otherwise improving it, the land, “notwithstanding his enclosure, was still to be 
looked on as waste, and might be the possession of any other.” Id., pars. 38, 184. 
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not simply appropriation of property, is the key concept in Locke’s understanding of economic 
development as well as an element in his theologically structured political theory.”24
Locke saw the inherent liberties and rights of individuals as bound up in the concept of 
property, which, in turn, was derived from the nature of human personality itself. For Locke, the 
initial postulate was self-ownership: “Though the earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to 
all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own person.”25 Locke admonished that “the preser-
vation of Property” is the “end of Government.”26
In a recent case involving land use regulation, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,27 the United 
States Supreme Court rejected a particularly stark assertion of legal positivism. A combination of 
Rhode Island statutes and environmental regulations precluded economically viable use of most 
of the land subsequently purchased by the petitioner. The state asserted that the very existence of 
these rules precluded the petitioner from raising a takings claim.28 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Kennedy declared that “the State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bun-
dle.”29
                                                 
24  Ashcraft, supra note 20, at 43, 45. 
25John Locke, Second Treatise of Government § 27, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett rev. ed., 
1988) (3d ed. 1698) (emphasis in original). 
26JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, book II, ¶ 138 (“The Supreme Power cannot take from any 
Man any Part of his Property without his own consent. For the preservation of Property being the end of Gov-
ernment, and that for which Men enter into Society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the People 
should have Property.”). 
27 533 U.S. 606 (2001). 
28 Id. at 626-27. For further explication, see Steven J. Eagle, The Regulatory Takings Notice Rule, 24 U. HAW. 
L. REV. 533 (2002). 
29 Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 627. 
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D. Property Rights as a Framework for Liberty and Prosperity 
The role of property rights in development efforts was noted by Federal Reserve chair-
man Alan Greenspan, who described “the rule of law, . . . property, . . . contract, . . . and judicial 
review and determination” as “the essential infrastructure of a market economy,”30
International officials have espoused similar sentiments. Addressing the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan declared that: “Without rules govern-
ing contracts and property rights; without confidence based on the rule of law; without trust and 
transparency-there could be no well-functioning markets.”31 The Managing Director of the In-
ternational Monetary Fund, Michel Camdessus, similarly noted that “the rule of law and respect 
for property,” along with “an independent judiciary and court system that can enforce property 
rights,” are “principles that can act as lodestars for all countries. . . .”32
The antithesis of the society governed by the rule of law is the society where everything 
is up for grabs. Herman Melville eloquently described the difference in his epic novel Moby 
Dick,33 where he generalized the distinction between “fast fish,” specifically whales that had 
been harpooned so as to belong to a particular ship, even if subsequently adrift, and “loose fish,” 
whales which were in their natural state or harpooned in a manner not perfecting a claim. The 
latter were available to be hunted by all. Melville analogized mortgaged land and serfs to “fast 
fish,” and the rights of man and the America before the arrival of Columbus to “loose fish.”34 As 
has become only too clear from the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v. City of New Lon-
                                                 
30 Text of Greenspan Speech to Woodrow Wilson Center Award Dinner, Bloomberg News, June 6, 1997, 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File Group (as quoted in O. Lee Reed, Nationbuilding 101: Reductionism in 
Property, Liberty, and Corporate Governance, 36 Vand. J. Transnat’l. 673, 713 (March 2003)). 
31 Kofi Annan, Address Before the United States Chamber of Commerce (June 10, 1999), in M2 Presswire, 
June 10, 1999, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Group File. (as quoted in, O. Lee Reed, Law, the Rule of Law, 
and Property: A Foundation for the Private Market and Business Study, 38 Am. Bus. L.J. 441, 442 (2001).)  
32 Michel Camdessus, Remarks Before the Warsaw School of Economics (Dec. 13, 1999) in M2 Presswire, 
Dec. 14, 1999, at 4, available in LEXIS, News Group File. ((as quoted in Id. at 441-442)). 
33 HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK (1st ed. London 1851). 
34 Id at ch. 89 (“Fast-Fish and Loose-Fish”). 
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don,35 even in a society founded on the rule of law, judicial interpretations can put private prop-
erty up for grabs.36
E. Private Property, Liberty and Wealth Creation  
Douglass North defines social institutions as “the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, . . . the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.37 The institution of 
private property is essential to individual liberty, the strengthening of civic institutions, and 
wealth formation both in developed and in developing nations. 
The benefit to society inuring from widespread ownership of property has been asserted 
by such disparate groups as the Southern Agrarian movement in the United States38 and modern 
experimental economists for a reconstituted civil society in Iraq.39 For some, the primary benefit 
of both property40 and contract41 is not maximization of wealth, but the furtherance of liberty. F. 
A. Hayek has stated: 
What our generation has forgotten is that the system of private property is the most im-
portant guaranty of freedom, not only for those who own property, but scarcely less for 
                                                 
35 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). 
36 See infra text accompanying notes 214-226. 
37 DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990). 
38 See, e.g., M. E. BRADFORD, REMEMBERING WHO WE ARE: OBSERVATIONS OF A SOUTHERN CONSERVATIVE 
86 (1985) (asserting that individual property ownership is vital to a culture of family self-reliance and liberty 
and that, for that reason, government should help individuals acquire property if necessary. 
39 Vernon L. Smith, The Iraqi People’s Fund, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 22, 2004). 
40 See, e.g., WALTER LIPPMANN, THE METHOD OF FREEDOM 100-102 (1934) “the only dependable foundation 
of personal liberty is the personal economic security of private property. . . . There is no surer way to give men 
the courage to be free than to insure them a competence upon which they can rely. Men cannot be made free 
by laws unless they are in fact free because no man can buy and no man can coerce them. That is why the Eng-
lishman’s belief that his home is his castle and that the king cannot enter it . . .  [is] the very essence of the free 
man’s way of life.) (quoted in Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 28 F.3d 1171, 1175 n. 8 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). 
41 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive 
Corporate Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, (1997). Bainbridge notes that, for mainstream contractari-
ans, private ordering is presumptively legitimate because it is efficient. “For conservative contractarians, this is 
precisely backwards: we regard efficiency as a presumptively legitimate norm precisely because it best serves 
our preference for private ordering through contract.” Id. at 859 n.199. 
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those who do not. It is only because the control of the means of production is divided 
among many people acting independently that nobody has complete power over us, that 
we as individuals can decide what to do with ourselves.42
A strong property rights regime is an essential element for strong economic growth and 
wealth creation. Property rights help nurture in individual citizens a sense of personal responsi-
bility, since the costs for failing to act as good stewards does not fall upon society as a whole, but 
rather redounds to the detriment of the individual owner.43
Beyond benefits to the individual, a strong property rights regime can even create incen-
tives for individuals to create institutions of social protection.44 Homeowners, for instance, have 
an enduring financial bond to their communities that tenants do not. They therefore tend to sup-
port local amenities that add to resale value, such as good schools, even when they make no per-
sonal use of them.45 Likewise, the prevention of theft is of interest to all property owners. There-
fore, not only do property owners take steps to protect their property, but they also assist in law 
enforcement since it is in their interest to do so. The rule of law as a whole is strengthened by 
this private interest.46 Paradoxically, collectivism strips the individual of responsibility for ad-
verse events and thus any reason to work for the collective benefit.47  
To help create these incentives to work for individual gain and the collective good, gov-
ernments must enforce a system of property rights that (1) are perceived to be permanent, (2) in-
clude the exclusive right of individuals to use their resources as they see fit, and (3) the exclusive 
                                                 
42F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 103-104 (1944, 1956 ed.). 
43 See, e.g., Alan Rufus Waters, Economic Growth and the Property Rights Regime, 7 CATO J. 99, 104-105 
(Spring/Summer 1987). See, also, Robert D. Cooter, Organization as Property: Economic Analysis of Property 
Law Applied to Privatization, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, (Christopher 
Clague & Gordon C. Rausser, eds., 1992) 77, 82. 
44 See, Waters, supra note 43, at 108-109. See also, MANCUR OLSON, POWER AND PROSPERITY: OUTGROWING 
COMMUNIST AND CAPITALIST DICTATORSHIPS 103-104 (2000). 
45 See generally, WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LO-
CAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND USE POLICIES (2001). 
46 See, OLSON, supra note 44, at 103-104. 
47 Waters, supra note 43, at 108-109. 
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right to voluntarily transfer or partition their rights.48 Permanency of the property rights gives 
individuals the confidence and security to use the land because the have assurance that they will 
reap the benefits of their labor. A government’s effective recognition of property rights is essen-
tial for allowing individuals to rely on those rights.49
Beneficial property rights regimes begin with a strong and clear land code. The land code 
should encompass three fundamental objectives: (1) achieving land tenure security for private 
landholders; (2) developing a market in land rights; and (c) defining and protecting remaining 
legitimate public interests. Land tenure security, the primary goal of any land code, exists when 
an individual perceives that he or she has the right to a piece of land on a continuous basis, free 
from imposition or interference from outside sources, as well as the ability to reap the benefits of 
labor and capital invested in the land, whether in use or upon transfer to another holder.50  
The establishment of a regime of land and other property rights is rarely performed on a 
clean slate. The existing set of property rights vested in private individuals and firms and com-
munal and state organizations must be accounted for as part of any effort to build a strong econ-
omy based on private property. The heart of the reform must therefore be in the legal system. 
Individuals working to grow their assets must be supported by clear laws defining their property 
rights. These laws, in turn, must be enforced by a judiciary that is resolves disputes swiftly and 
fairly. Processes for establishing and recording property rights must be well thought out and 
streamlined so that the rights are established as quickly and as at the lowest cost possible.51
II. ADVISING EASTERN EUROPEAN NATIONS 
A. General Advice from American Institutions and Agencies 
The collapse of Soviet influence over Eastern Europe during the late 1980s and early 
1990s provided a unique opportunity for privatization advocates to test their theories of eco-
                                                 
48 Id. at 104-105; Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr. and Lee Hoskins, Property Rights: The Key to Economic Develop-
ment, POL’Y ANALYSIS, No. 482, 8-9 (Aug. 7, 2003). 
49 Frank B. Cross, Law and Economic Growth, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1737, 1741-1742 (June 2002).  
50 Dana Tumenova, Evolution of Land Reform in Russia: The 2001 Land Code and its Impact on the Commer-
cial Real Estate Market and Direct Foreign Investment, 11 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 769, 789-790 (June 2002).  
51 Waters, supra note 43, at 112-113. Cross, supra note 49, at 1742. 
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nomic growth. Eager to facilitate market economies and democracy, private American organiza-
tions and the United States government offered advice and support to these countries. The goal 
was to build market-based, democratic societies grounded in the rule of law and private property. 
1. Advice from Private American Institutions 
There has been widespread agreement among economists and other scholars on the fun-
damental tasks necessary for a successful transition from a socialist to a free market economy. 
However, there has not been a similar consensus on the manner and timing in which some of 
these steps are to be implemented. 
The agreed upon tasks can be grouped into four broad categories: (1) Institutional Re-
form; (2) Enterprise Reform and Structuring; (3) Price and Market Reform; and (4) Macroeco-
nomic Stabilization.52 Western governments can best assist in this process through financial and 
technical assistance and by providing access to their markets. This article discusses the first two 
tasks.53
Institutional reform can be understood as the redefinition of the role of the state from 
controlling the economy to a government of institutions that facilitate a strong free market econ-
omy. Necessary elements include legal and regulatory reform, the development of a basic social 
safety net, and the reform of government institutions involved in activities such as tax admini-
stration and monetary control. Institutions include a diverse collection of socially developed con-
straints, such as regulatory bodies or sets of rules within such organization, on individual ac-
tion.54 Such institutions, generally, should function in support of the market as opposed to con-
trolling it. A society with well functioning supporting institutions allows individuals to enter into 
a multitude of complex agreements. Conversely, in a country without supporting institutions, in-
                                                 
52 Lawrence Summers, The Next Decade in Central and Eastern Europe, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET 
ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE supra note 5, at 23, 32. 
53 The third task, price and market reform, includes removing price controls, liberalizing trade, and creating 
competitive factor markets. The final task, macroeconomic stabilization, focuses on tightening fiscal and credit 
policies and addressing internal and external imbalances. Id. at 32. 
54 William E. Kovacic, Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in Transition Economies: The 
Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265, 271 (2001). 
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dividuals struggle to enforce their rights and shy away for interacting with other entities in mutu-
ally beneficial ways.55  
Among the most important reforms of government institutions is the establishment of an 
independent and well-functioning judiciary to resolve property disputes and enforce property 
rights.56 This most likely will result in decisions that promote economic efficiency and therefore 
lead to wealth enhancement,57 as in the common law tradition.58 Although private parties can 
rely on market enforcement mechanisms and other non-judicial dispute resolution methods to 
some extent, in the long run weak courts seriously will restrict growth.59
In addition to a strong judiciary, scholars largely agreed upon the necessity of regulatory 
bodies that interpret and administer the law, and possess appropriate market oversight responsi-
bilities. For instance, an antitrust agency would help prevent collusion, predatory pricing, and 
other abusive practices. Antitrust regulation is particularly important to development of a strong 
competitive market in Eastern Europe, since prior regimes stressed centrally planned economies 
and regarded competition as wasteful.60 Trade policy, securities, banking regulation, tax policy, 
and a social safety net should be administered through the government in a way that supports and 
is beneficial to the market.61 Organized and run properly, these bodies will help develop a strong 
and secure market. However, such agencies should be fully aware of the possibility of and be 
                                                 
55 Christopher Clague, Philip Keefer, et al., Institutions and Economic Performance: Property Rights and Con-
tract Enforcement, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: GROWTH AND GOVERNANCE IN LESS-
DEVELOPED AND POST-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 67, 68-69 (Christopher Clague, ed. 1997). 
56 Kovacic, supra note 54, at 271. 
57 Cooter, supra note 43, at 77, 97. 
58 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adju-
dication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980). 
59 Kovacic, supra note 54, at 271. 
60 Robert D. Willig, Anti-Monopoly Policies and Institutions, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN 
EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 43, at 187, 188-189. 
61 Christopher Clague, The Journey to a Market Economy, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN 
EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 43, at 1, 16-17.  
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careful to avoid overextending their regulatory reach and consequently retarding market 
growth.62
Rounding out a market-supportive infrastructure, such entities as universities and profes-
sional schools and organizations would assist in developing the expertise necessary for intelli-
gent and uniform application of the law. In particular, judges need to be able to understand the 
complex deals that an open market produces and the consequences of their decisions in order to 
administer the law efficiently.63 Similarly, regulators need to be able to understand the markets 
they are regulating in order to facilitate strong growth while avoid overregulation.64  
A general land use framework, with administration delegated to local government, could 
support economic growth when tailored to local traditions and, in general, offers wide discretion 
to market forces while allowing for a system of dispute resolution.65 The key, however, is clearly 
defined procedures for obtaining necessary permits and enforcing rights. Without clear proce-
dural guide lines, the process will be extremely inefficient.66 Conversely, clear procedural guide-
lines and limited involvement will allow the market to grow and allocate land resources effi-
ciently. 
Legislative action and administrative interpretation must support private property rights 
and market activities. Economists have suggested narrow, general and easily implemented legis-
lation, permitting room for legal interpretations that will mould the law to efficiently work with 
the market.67 However, the reason for this also lies in the nature of the political process. Legisla-
tive reform requires the support of the population which may be too fickle to support reforms 
over a long period of time. Scholars agree that the absolutely necessary legislation should be 
                                                 
62 Willig, supra note 60, at 195.  
63 Kovacic, supra note 54, at 272-273.  
64 See, generally, Clague, supra note 61, at 17.  
65 Cheryl W. Gray, Rebecca J. Hanson and Michael Heller, Hungarian Legal Reform for the Private Sector, 26 
GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 293, 315. (1992). 
66 Id.  
67 Cooter, supra note 43, at 96. 
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passed while the population is still energized by the prospect of market reforms.68 This political 
consideration played a big role in the division among scholars over the timing of privatization.69
a. Enterprise Reform 
“Enterprise reform” may be defined as the development of a private sector through the 
establishment of well defined property rights, the restructuring of enterprises and the facilitation 
of the entry and exit of firms. The timing of privatization efforts in a developing economy re-
mains an issue: 
In retrospect, there is widespread agreement on the importance of institutional reform to 
successful transition. In an ideal world, there reforms should precede or at least accom-
pany enterprise privatization. But in a less than ideal world, there is no consensus on how 
much institutional reform was feasible in Russia during the 1990s, nor on whether rapid 
enterprise privatization, despite weak institutions, was better than available alternatives. 
Gradualist authors, who include both economists and political scientists, believe that the 
Russian government could have done significantly better at institutional reform, if Presi-
dent Yeltsin had made this reform a political priority.70
There is general agreement that the process of reforming property rights should take into 
account each nation’s traditions and the nature of its current law. The property rights regimes in 
Eastern Europe are not being established in a vacuum. For example, in Russia, property rights 
are being layered on top of Soviet collectivism and pre-Soviet civil law.71 The Czech Republic 
has a history where land ownership was recognized, but was rendered largely meaningless be-
cause the state retained the right to use the land.72 The right to own land was not a foreign con-
cept and was accomplished without must difficulty, but rights of exclusion and use needed to be 
                                                 
68 Id. at 96. See, Clague, supra note 61, at 21.  
69 See supra text accompanying notes 70-74. 
70 Bernard S. Black & Anna S. Tarassova, Institutional Reform in Transition: A Case Study of Russia, 10 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 211, 220 (2003). 
71 Gianmaria Ajani and Ugo Mattei, Codifying Property Law in the Process of Transition: Some Suggestions 
from Comparative Law and Economics, 19 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 117, 118 (Fall 1995). 
72 Donovan W. Burke, Argument for the Allocation of Resources to the Development of a Well-Defined System 
of Real Property Law in the Czech Republic, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 661, 682 (May, 1996). 
v. 8.09.05 
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art35
 15
developed largely from scratch.73 A property rights system also must account for the agrarian, 
industrial, or mixed nature of the country as the system is introduced.74
A property rights system must also be able to facilitate change in land usage and indus-
trial structure. Entry and exit of firms and individuals creates efficient land use and corporate 
structure. Property rights regimes that prescribed certain land uses and corporate forms should be 
discouraged. Instead, a private property rights regime is beneficial if it provided a frame work for 
competition among alternative uses.75 The key is transferability. Property rights must easily be 
exchangeable to allow property to migrate to its most efficient use. Otherwise, property use will 
remain inefficient and the market will not be allowed to grow.76  
Of course, antecedent to efficient transfer between private individuals, land, other natural 
resources, and enterprises must be transferred from the state to private ownership. Auctions and 
“spontaneous privatizations” appear to be the preferred methods for such transfers because both 
seem to be the most efficient option in most situations. “Spontaneous privatization” involves a 
“sweetheart” sale of an enterprise to the existing management.77 This process, although not the 
most equitable, places the enterprise in the hands of managers who will either be able to adapt it 
for efficient use or realize its sale value. Also, it would tend to keep the vast majority of a coun-
try’s enterprises out of the hands of cash rich foreigners, at least temporarily.78
A flexible system that facilitates the mobility of private industry must have a functioning 
private housing ownership and rental market. Industry cannot prosper with an immobile labor 
force resulting from insufficient housing.79 However, privatizing housing is one of the more dif-
                                                 
73 Id. at 683. 
74 Id. Ajani et al., supra note 71, at 126-127. 
75 Cooter, supra note 43, at 97. 
76 See, generally, Id.  
77 See, Stanley Fischer, Privatization in East European Transformation, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET 
ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 43, at 227, 231-233. 
78 Cooter, supra note 43, at 93. 
79 Thomas Gale Moore, Privatization in the Former Soviet Empire, in ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN EASTERN 
EUROPE AND RUSSIA: REALITIES OF REFORM, (Edward P. Lazear, ed.) 180.  
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ficult aspects of an overall privatization program.80 The sale of housing to non-residents would 
create conflict with the current residents. Furthermore, even if preferred access to housing is 
given to local residents, housing prices will probably rise.81
Hungary’s solution to this problem was nationalizing the property and compensating to 
former owners in the form of lump sum coupons reflecting the value of the property.82 These 
coupons could then be used as full or partial payment for property undergoing privatization.83 
The main success of this program was the avoidance of clouded titles.84 Clear title was seen a 
main goal in the privatization of housing along with the facilitation of sales and construction.85 
Advice, therefore, focused the assessing the viability of and the providing of technical advice for 
the development of certain vital pieces of a housing market, such as a construction sector and 
mortgage lending facilities.86 By establishing new housing, driven by demand and supported by 
appropriate government institutions, the housing market should gradually become privatized.87  
Privatization is unquestionably the linchpin of reform recommendations for Eastern 
Europe. Private ownership of land and enterprises will give individuals incentives to use the land 
for its most efficient purpose or sell to someone who will do so. Either way, the property will 
gravitate towards its most efficient use in the society. The viability of the privatization process 
and whether it produces long term economic growth, however, appears to depend largely on the 
timing of the privatization.  
                                                 
80 Id. See also, Fischer, supra note 77, at 242. 
81 Id.  
82 Gray et al., supra note 65, at 309. 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 310. 
85 Id. at 312-313. See also, Ted K. Smith, The Foreign Investment Regime of the Russian Federation: Progress 
Toward a System of Free Entry, 11 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 310, 323-25 (1993).  
86 Id. 
87 See, Smith, supra note 85, at 323-25.  
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b. Reform Timing 
The early dispute among scholars focused on the timing on the implementation of the re-
form steps. Initially, much of the private university and think tank advice focused on state organ-
ized mass privatization.88 The so called “Big Bang” or “Shock Therapy” method, whereby priva-
tization is carried out at once and on a mass scale under the direction of the national government. 
In other words, enterprise reform was to come first and fast.89 Conversely, voluntary or “ad hoc” 
privatization carried out one enterprise at a time over a long period of time was advocated by 
other scholars who believed that institutional reform had to be in place before a predominantly 
private economy could thrive.90  
Advocates of shock therapy supported it because the believed that privatization had to be 
carried out while the population still supported it. Slow privatization during a period of institu-
tion reform, conversely, was thought to allow managers to strip company assets and workers and 
managers to collude to raise wages. Such activity, it was feared, would give the public the im-
pression that privatization does not work.91 Rapid massive reforms would create property owners 
and demonstrate the benefits of privatization before any opponents could act to derail the re-
forms. 
 For example, Harvard University’s Jeffery D. Sachs urged Russia to rapidly adopt re-
forms that comprehensively address and install a private ownership system. Sachs believed that 
Russian privatization would work best if the national Russian government enacted reforms that 
privatized thousands of the larger industrial enterprises simultaneously, transferring them into 
joint stock companies with share distribution reflecting the current balance of interest in the en-
                                                 
88 See Jeffrey D. Sachs, Privatization in Russia: Some Lessons from Eastern Europe, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 43, 
43-44 (May 1992). See also Armeane M. Choksi et al., The Design of Successful Trade Liberalization Policies, 
in FOREIGN ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION 37 (Andres Koves & Paul Marer eds., 1991); Edward P. Lazear, Eco-
nomic Reform: Appropriate Steps and Actual Policies, in ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND 
RUSSIA: REALITIES OF REFORM, supra note 79, at 15-16; ANDERS ASLUND, BUILDING CAPITALISM, 76 (2002). 
89 Id. 
90 See, Paul H. Brietzke, Designing the Legal Frameworks for Markets in Eastern Europe, 7 TRANSNAT’L 
LAW. 35, 42. See also, Charles Cadwell, Legal Reform in Transition Economies, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECO-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 43, 251, 266-267; Aslund, supra note 88, at 100. 
91 Sachs, supra note 88, at 43-44. 
v. 8.09.05 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
 18
terprises.92 The federal Russian government would maintain ownership of a minority of shares 
and then distribute them over the course of several years. For medium and small sized shops, 
Sachs recommended that Russia follow Eastern Europe’s example and orchestrate worker-
management buyouts. Finally, he advocated auctions for ownership of retail shops.93 A few 
years later, Sachs was holding up Russia as an example that mass, rapid privatization was the 
right course for economic growth. Failing to privatize rapidly, Sachs believed, would result in 
the holding up or even sabotage of political reform by former bureaucrats. The government must 
take the opportunity to privatize and demonstrate the benefits of a free market system while they 
have the chance. By creating property owners as soon as possible, rapid privatization would in-
stall a middle class with a stake in the effective maintenance of property rights and the pursuit of 
governmental policies that further support the private sector.94  
Some scholars criticized the shock therapy concept at the time and it has come under 
even more criticism since for placing the onus on rapid enterprise reform by the state instead of 
allowing property rights to form and develop at the local level with government institutional 
support. They believed that property rights in the context of a modern society are too complex 
and individualized to simply be installed for the development of a market economy.95 Although 
basic legal protections, such as right to a home, are simple to identify and protect, many property 
rights are not as easy to identify prior to development. In these situations, law must work with 
industry rules of practice and customs.96
In Eastern Europe, the industrialization from the communist era necessitated the creation 
of property rights beyond simple rules.97 In this context, property rights must be allowed to de-
velop in response to market demand as opposed to being installed as a precondition to a market 
                                                 
92 Id. at 46. 
93 Id. at 47. 
94 Jeffrey D. Sachs, The Transition at Mid Decade, 86 AM. ECON. REV., 128, 132-133 (May, 1996). 
95 See, e.g., Andrzej Rapaczynski, The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights, 10 J. 
ECON. PERSPECTIVES, 87, 89 (Spring, 1996); Brietzke, supra note 90 at 42. See, also, Aslund, supra note 88, at 
100. 
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economy. State imposed property rights might impede market development instead of reinforc-
ing and working in connection with self-enforcing market mechanisms. Laws form an important 
part of the establishment of a strong property rights regime, but must function with market forces 
to be truly effective in supporting a vibrant economy.98
Many commentators assert that private enterprises work well only after a society has es-
tablished the institutions that interact with the market to form an efficient private sector. This is 
the role meant for government involvement during the early stages. A set of new rules should be 
established to inspire confidence in would be private investors. Of primary importance is the es-
tablishment of a legal infrastructure for the private sector, including: commercial and contract 
law, anti-trust and labor law, rules regarding foreign owner companies, laws relating to the trans-
fer of property, laws affecting landlord-tenant relations and creating systems for recording and 
transferring such rights. In addition, all these measures are of little practical value unless the laws 
are supported by courts and trained professionals who can settle disputes and enforce the laws.99 
These reforms must precede major privatization efforts to avoid mass disorder and lawlessness in 
the process.  
More recent analysis of these early attempts demonstrates that the advocates of beginning 
the process with the development of government supporting institutions were correct and was 
largely overlooked as a vital factor for successful rapid privatization by advocates of the “big-
bang” theory.100 In Russia, for instance, mass privatization was conducted in a society with little 
history involving such government institutions.101 This privatization was, therefore, largely con-
ducted in a void. Prosperity did not follow because the institutions supporting the property rights 
                                                 
98 Id. at 102.  
99 See Christopher Clague, The Journey to a Market Economy, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN 
EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 43, at 1, 5.  
100 See David Lipton and Jeffery Sachs, Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, 2 BROOKINGS 
PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY, 293, 328 (1990) (acknowledging the role of socialist reforms of the 1980s, 
but disregarding their importance in the relatively successful Polish privatization program). 
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were virtually non-existent. The Russian mob stepped into this void, offering property owners 
“protection” at a price.102
Conversely, in both the Czech Republic and Poland, privatization has been relatively suc-
cessful. In the Czech Republic, the new government was able to reinstitute much of the pre-
communist revolution law with modifications reflecting the desired changes to the law and prop-
erty rights structure. The privatization was able to rest on old traditions and legal framework that 
once helped that country’s markets grow. 103 In Poland, the background reforms that were begin-
ning as far back as 1981 allowed for a more rapid transition to a private economy in the early 
1990s.104 The pace of privatization can be rapid if the individual country’s traditions and history 
so allow, but such privatization should not begin until the appropriate government institutions for 
protecting individual property rights are in place.  
As reflected in a report issued by the World Bank, private and governmental development 
institutions have come to recognize that “if the transition economies are to join the ranks of the 
advanced market economies, they will need not just good economic policies but strong and ac-
countable institutions to support . . . them.”105 The focus has shifted to “securing the economic 
and social fundamentals” and “reinvigorating institutional capability.”106 In the final analysis, it 
may be faster to just create private property in name, but the more difficult task of creating a 
property legal structure to enforce these rights in practice with regard to the equal exclusionary 
rights of other is the essential first step to successfully creating market growth in a society.107 
Private assets tend eventually to end up in the possession of those who most value them regard-
less of the method of privatization used. Nevertheless, the speed with which a country can de-
                                                 
102 Id. See also, O. Lee Reed, Nationbuilding 101: Reductionism in Property, Liberty, and Corporate Govern-
ance, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 673, 712-713 (March 2003) (discussing the consequences of the Russian 
privatization measures on Russian industrial management). 
103 North, supra note 101, at 328. 
104 Lipton et al., supra note 100, at 303. 
105 World Bank, World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market (1996) (as quoted in David Campbell, 
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velop the necessary supporting institutions and progress towards privatization of its society on 
any sort of a mass scale is dependent upon a country’s traditions and the institutions already in 
place.108
2. United States Government Advice and Assistance  
Since the waning of the Soviet Union’s influence, many Eastern European countries have 
invited the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to assist in their efforts in mak-
ing the transition from a centrally planned to a market economy. Upon these invitations, USAID 
established missions dedicated to the task of assisting in the development of each country. These 
missions do not fund and perform self-contained activities aimed at changing a country’s eco-
nomic system.109 Instead, USAID assists the country’s reformers in weighing options, refining 
technical solutions and helping to build analytic capacity to implement and manage reforms in 
accordance with the mission’s strategic objectives.110 Over the course of the early 1990’s many 
countries turned to USAID for help in creating an economy based on private ownership.111 
USAID also contracts out and awards grants to private institutions based on their assessment of a 
country’s need. With a few exceptions, USAID will solicit bids for projects and select from 
among the competitors.112  
The first task in developing a USAID mission to a country is determining a set a strategic 
objectives that focus the issues for which the county requested help. Generally, USAID’s strate-
gic objectives for Eastern European countries included accelerated development and growth of 
private enterprises. The objectives also called for more effective, responsive and accountable lo-
                                                 
108 North, supra note 101, at 327. 
109 See USAID, USAID/Russia Strategy Amendment 1999-2005, H-1, (February 2002), available at 
http://www.usaid.ru/en/main/activity/index.shtml?activity_id=644. 
110 Id. 
111 For a list of the Eastern European countries currently working with USAID missions, see the USAID web-
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cal governments.113 USAID support, accordingly, has focused on the creation of a property 
rights system that is supported by strong laws and allowed to develop via the market. Therefore, 
much of the work has been advice and technical support for the formation of property rights leg-
islation and recordation systems.  
Although officials recognized that advice needed to be tailored to the specific country’s 
customs and traditions, there are several common themes that can be found in the advice given 
and supported by the United States government. For example, United States officials focused 
their efforts on providing what they called “demand-driven technical assistance.”114 This means 
that they wanted provide advice in response to requests from organizations within the country 
instead of attempting to impose a preconceived program. This policy reflects the acknowledge-
ment that reforms are most effective in situations where the market is ready for them and where 
the reforms account for and reflect the market realities of the specific region. 
Towards this end, another focus of USAID and its contractors was to train local officials 
in carrying out the necessary acts for implementation and the running of the private land reform 
policies in their region.115 In addition, the systems created were drawn up to be clear and con-
cise. The idea was to facilitate the transition to a private property regime in a manner as unobtru-
sive as possible with the lives of the local residents.116 The simpler and cost effective the process 
of privatization and the local administration of the system, the easier it is to get local people and 
firms participating in it and relying upon it. 
To support all of this work at the local level, the efforts at the level of national govern-
ment focused on legal reform and assisting in drawing up and enacting legislation. This frame-
                                                 
113 Kenneth J. Kopstein, The Russian Housing Sector Reform Project Phases I and II, Prepared for the Office 
of Program and Policy Development USAID Mission to Russia 15 (Nov. 1999). 
114 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Kopstein, USAID Assistance Program to Poland in Local Government and Housing 
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2000). 
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work supported the local programs by providing a background that ensured the property rights 
would be upheld in the face of local corruption and gave local authorities the backbone upon 
which to build reforms. 
All these actions reflect a belief that land reform is most effectively enacted when re-
forms are allowed to form in accordance with local markets based on a national legal framework. 
Conversely, reforms carried out directly on a national scale can incapacitate economic progress 
by contradicting the realities of local markets. Land reform at the national level should leave a 
flexibility that allows local officials and the market itself to flourish and work in conjunction 
with a strong property rights regime.  
B. Nation-Specific Reform Efforts 
Over the past 15 years, many of these general concepts have been tested in the Eastern 
European countries. USAID and private American institutions have been in these countries con-
tinually offering advice and helping implement their recommendations. This section explores 
these efforts in several of the numerous countries trying to privatize their economies. 
1. Russia 
In the early 1990’s the Russian Federation began the process of reversing the sate owner-
ship of land system that had been instituted after the Soviet Revolution of 1917. As with other 
countries, Russian history and traditions in land tenure were an important consideration in adapt-
ing general concepts of privatization to the Russian Federation.  
a. Land Ownership 
The state monopoly on land ownership in the Russian Federation was first broken by the 
passage of the Law on Land Reform (November 23, 1990) and the Law on Property (December 
24, 1990). The Law on Property provided that parcels of land can be held privately by individu-
als and entities as well as by the state. These principles were later affirmed in the constitution of 
the Russian Federation.117  
                                                 
117 See Alexey Overchuk, Development of Private Landownership in Russia, Country Studies: Real Estate Pri-
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To support these principles of land ownership, the Civil Code of the Russian Federation 
defines private property rights. Article 209, The Content of Property Rights of the code provides 
that: 
• The owner possesses the rights to hold, to use, and to dispose of his property. 
• The owner at his own pleasure may take any actions with respect to the property in his 
possession as long as they do not conflict with laws and other legal acts and do not 
harm the rights and interests of other persons as they are protected by the law; he (the 
owner) may alienate his own property as property to other persons or transfer to them 
rights to hold and to use and to dispose of the property while remaining its owner, or to 
use the property as collateral or to exchange in any way or to dispose of it in any other 
way. 
• Holding, use, and disposal of land and other natural resources is carried out freely by 
the owner to the extent their transfer is allowed by law (Article 129) and as long as it 
does not harm the environment and lawful interests of other persons. 
• The owner may transfer his property into trust management to another person (trust ad-
ministrator). The transfer of property into trust management does not consequently af-
fect the transfer of ownership rights to the trust administrator who must manage the 
property in the interests of the owner or other persons as requested by the owner.118
The Code goes on to define the means of acquiring, inheriting, confiscating, transferring, 
and terminating ownership rights in immovable property (i.e.: land parcels and everything tightly 
attached to the land so that its movement is impossible without causing considerable damage). In 
general, the transfer of land is carried out on a contract basis.119
b. b. Housing 
The Russian government also tried to privatize housing in the early days of the Russian 
Federation. Initially, the government tried to privatize housing by selling units at low cost. This 
effort met with little initial success, since only about 8.2% of Russian housing had been trans-
ferred to private ownership by the time USAID became involved in 1992.120
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As USAID became involved, the Russian government began taking new measures to 
transfer housing to private ownership. USAID’s involvement in the project was spearheaded by 
the Urban Institute and consisted of several elements. First, the project strategy called for the de-
sign and implementation of demonstration projects to prove that a particular housing reform 
could be developed in Russia. USAID then focused on assisting in the legal reforms necessary 
for the implementation of the housing reforms. USAID also promised technical assistance on the 
demand driven housing projects undertaken by individual Russian cities and agencies.121  
Possibly the most critical aspect of housing reform was the development of appropriate 
policies and legislation that supported all the functional activities of housing reform. Over the 
eight years of the project, the project staff assisted in over 160 federal laws, executive orders, 
and regulations. The December 1992 Law of Fundamentals of Federal Housing Policy allowed 
the implementation of the housing reform activities advocated by USAID. Laws were later 
passed on such key aspects as Mortgages and the Recording of Real Estate Rights. These legal 
reforms have brought Russia along way towards the establishment of a fee market system of 
housing.122  
The major legal reforms on housing during the 1992 to 1995 included the elaboration and 
adoption of the laws “On Fundamentals of Federal Housing Policy,” “On Privatization of the 
Housing Stock in the Russian Federation,” and the first part of the Civil Code of the Russian 
Federation. These acts provided the legal basis for the establishment of privately owned housing. 
This legislative foundation was then supplemented by numerous later acts, including acts that 
established a real estate rights registration system and establishing legal relations for mortgage 
lending.123
c. c. Results and Recent Measures 
The success for these early efforts was limited at best. The initial focus on agrarian land 
and the later efforts on urban areas resulted in only about 7.6% of the land in the country being 
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owned by legal entities and private citizens by the year 2000.124 Due to the vast open spaces of 
the Russian Federation, this figure is deceptively small, but is also hardly and indicator of an un-
qualified success. Much of the land is simply undesirable to potential investors.  
One of the main problems, however, was that much of the land was unavailable for sale 
do to conflicting legislative constraints. For example, more that two-thirds of agricultural land is 
either protected by law or are unattractive to potential investors.125 As significant piece of these 
lands cannot be transferred to the private sector because it used for transportation, broadcasting, 
defense, security, the space program, or protected wildlife areas. The situation for housing urban 
land is similarly constrained by these factors. 126
The Land Code passed in 2001 provide important steps towards a framework for land 
ownership, but the limited reach of these laws also reflects a continued political opposition to 
strong property rights. The Land Code represents in part a response to the need for clearly de-
fined and enforceable property rights in Russia. Up to this point commercial real estate develop-
ment had been hampered by a process by which land regulation had been left up to presidential 
decree or regional governors. The 2001 Code recognizes that strong predictable land rights spur 
investment (both foreign and domestic) and consequently progress by providing investors with a 
dependable assurance of their rights.127 For example, prior Russian laws providing for only in-
complete ownership of land by foreign companies limited foreign investment.128 Until Russia 
establishes dependable property rights, foreign investment might be minimal.129
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2. Poland 
The principal goal of the USAID housing strategy for Poland was “the emergence of a 
competitive, modern, market-based housing finance and production system.” Early efforts fo-
cused on assessing the viability and providing technical advice for the development of certain 
vital pieces of a housing market, such as a construction sector and mortgage lending facilities.130 
Assistance in building and mortgage lending were accompanied by policy assistance. Among 
other legislative assistance, USAID had major input in the 1997 Mortgage Banking Law, the 
Condominium Law and Mortgage Bank and contract savings legislation. USAID also assisted in 
the initiation of an effective bank regulatory and supervisory system.131  
USAID also focused its early efforts on assisting new, inexperienced, local political lead-
ership with the transition to transparent and accountable governance through the strengthening of 
fiscal and managerial capabilities of local governments and local non-government institutions.132  
3. Georgia 
The USAID strategic plan for Georgia for 1996-2000 mentioned land reform as a high 
priority for the Georgian government. In the introduction USAID states that “here is a unique 
opportunity to build a market-based and democratic society grounded in the rule of law and 
private property if Georgia decentralizes economic and political power and privatizes its ag-
ricultural resources, industrial capacity, and infrastructure.”133
For Georgia to move towards a market-based society, many steps needed to be taken in 
regard to private property rights. The Government needed to work to create an integrated eco-
nomic, legal and regulatory framework to stimulate private sector investment and growth, com-
prehensive private financial markets, and establish private land, both agricultural and urban, that 
could be freely bought and sold.134
                                                 
130 Kopstein, supra note 39, at 23-24. 
131 Id. at 33. 
132 Id. at 26 
133 United States Development Strategic Plan For Georgia, USAID, 11 (April, 1996). 
134 Id. 
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a. Land Ownership 
One of USAID’s primary activities in Georgia during this period focused on the rapid 
creation of a land market. USAID advocated and assisted Georgian officials in working to im-
plement a clear, simple and legally sound land registration system as a way of creating this mar-
ket. This system developed around two main categories of land: Agricultural Land and Non-
Agricultural (Urban and Industrial) Land. 
Agricultural land privatization began in Georgia almost immediately after it gained inde-
pendence in 1992. As of 2000, approximately 1 million Georgians had privatized 3 million agri-
cultural parcels. Despite a successful privatization plan, there was no movement on land registra-
tion rights and the old system did not meet the requirements of the new privatization laws. After 
analysis, the government initiated a USAID supported agricultural land registration program in 
1999 by presidential order. Some key points included: 
• An initial land registration that is free of charge for farmers, increasing interest in regis-
tering rights to land; 
• Local private companies and private entities conducted initial registration, simplifying 
the registration process; 
• An initial registration process that is comprehensible for farmers and free of useless bu-
reaucratic steps; 
• An initial registration of land parcels permitting the recording of land transactions sub-
sequent to privatization at the time of registration; 
• An initial registration process that is transparent and all interested persons have access 
to the information they seek. 
The initial registration system was inexpensive and effective. Since 1999, almost one mil-
lion parcels of agricultural land have been registered and subsequent transactions have been held 
on tens of thousands of these parcels. 135 Thus, one of the problems in the privatization process in 
Georgia was solved at minimal cost by creating a simple process enacted in large part by local 
authorities as opposed to setting up a large central bureaucracy. 
In the Georgian civil code, non-agricultural land includes urban and industrial land. Al-
though land reform started with agricultural land, the privatization of urban and industrial land 
began in 1997 and has been largely successful. The success in part had been attributed to the fact 
                                                 
135 Arsenashvili, supra note 116, at 2. 
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that, like the agricultural land registration process, the privatization of non-agricultural land was 
designed to be as simple and cost effective as possible. First, the privatization process effectively 
utilized existing documentation and was molded into the existing government structure in order 
to avoid creating useless bureaucratic steps. The process established with these concerns in mind 
was transparent, accurate in the recording of rights, affordable and responsive to the market as 
opposed to the being limited to the land boundaries and usage that was established under the 
communist state.136  
4.  Kosovo 
Unlike the many of the other countries that arose out of the fall of the Soviet Union’s in-
fluence in Eastern Europe, Kosovo experienced several years of civil war and ethnic discrimina-
tion following the end to socialist rule in Yugoslavia. Land reform, therefore, did not begin until 
after the 1999 conflict. At that point, the land ownership and registration system was in a state of 
confusion due to the rapidly changing political system. In the preceding years, the legal frame-
work concerning property rights questioned, canceled and revised several times. In addition, the 
conflicts have damaged much of the land records and the property itself. USAID has proposed 
way in which it can provide assistance to correct the lack of clear and recorded property rights 
that has been limiting economic development.137
a. Legal Framework 
USAID’s recommendations revolve around improving the legal framework supporting 
property rights. The current legal framework is rife with gaps and uncertainty. The government 
needs to fill these gaps and bolster the current laws supporting private ownership and the land 
market. New legislation should amend current laws and establish new regulations that allow the 
land market to develop and work efficiently. For example, a current provision gives municipali-
                                                 
136 Id. at 3. 
137 David Stanfield, et al., An Assessment of Property Rights in Kosovo: Final Report, USAID Contract No. 
LAG-00-98-00031-00, Task Order No. 4, 4 (2004). 
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ties and agricultural socially owned enterprises the “right of first refusal” that requires their ap-
proval for the sale of land.138
To implement and uphold these laws, USAID looking to develop guidance for legal pro-
fessionals, judges and institutions involved in upholding property rights. Such support will help 
to ensure even, consistent, and fair application of the property rights. This will help restore the 
public’s knowledge and confidence that their rights will be protected and they can, therefore, rely 
on them in their actions.139
b. Land Administration 
USAID is also working to support municipalities’ administration of land and harmonize 
this with land administration programs of other countries in the region. This will allow local mu-
nicipalities to inventory property ownership and provide a basis for the assignment of socially 
owned property. Staff must also be established and trained in the operation of a new immovable 
property rights registration system.140  
III. THE WEAKENING STRANDS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. American Rights, Property and Lockean Values 
In the United States, the generation of the Framers did not have to create a theory of 
property rights anew, but were able to draw upon a great source of intellectual and political capi-
tal. They regarded liberty and property as part and parcel of the historic “rights of English-
men.”141
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 had affirmed that even the king was subject to the rule 
of law. The writers of the English and Scottish Enlightenment realized that government was a 
compact among individuals for the preservation of their liberties—an idea important to the suc-
cess of the Glorious Revolution. John Locke was the best known of these authors to eighteenth 
                                                 
138 Id. at 113. 
139 Id.  
140 Id. at 117. 
141 FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 13 
(1985). 
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century Americans. It was Locke’s Second Treatise of Government that declared: “Lives, Liber-
ties, and Estates, which I call by the general Name, Property.”142 James Madison rephrased this 
as: “As a man is said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a property in 
his rights.”143 According to a leading historian of the Revolutionary period, “By the late eight-
eenth century, ‘Lockean’ ideas of government and revolution were accepted everywhere in 
America; they seemed, in fact, a statement of principles built into English constitutional tradi-
tion.”144 As John Adams, who as president had appointed Chief Justice Marshall, declared, 
“Property must be secured or liberty cannot exist.”145
During recent years, the U.S. Supreme Court has, from time to time, recognized the cen-
trality of property rights to individual liberty. In Dolan v. City of Tigard,146 the Court declared 
that “[w]e see no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the 
Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated to the status of 
a poor relation.”147 In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency,148 the Court referred for first time to the “Armstrong principle” of fairness.149 In Arm-
strong v. United States, it noted that the Takings Clause was “designed to bar Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by 
the public as a whole.”150
                                                 
142 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 123 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., Liberal Arts Press 
1952) (1690).  
143 James Madison, Property, 1 NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, at 174, reprinted in 4 LETTERS AND OTHER 
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 478 (1867). 
144 Pauline Maier, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 87 (1997). 
145 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 280 (Charles Francis Adams ed. 1850). 
146 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
147 Id. at 392. 
148 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
149 Id. at 321. 
150 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
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Nevertheless, the tenuous status private property rights in the United States contrasts 
sharply with the clear articulation of the importance of such rights so cogently articulated to 
Eastern Europe nations.151
B. The Temptation to Subsume Property in Regulation 
1. The Growth of the Regulatory State 
In the broadest sense, the weakening of the fabric of American property rights is con-
comitant with the rise of the regulatory state. During the early decades of the twentieth century, 
the Progressive movement developed the theme that the application of expertise to human affairs 
could alleviate all manner of economic and social ills. Progressivism, as manifested in the New 
Deal, spawned massive administrative bureaucracies and numerous regulations in fields such as 
commerce, housing, labor, and permissible land uses.152 This new regulatory landscape pro-
foundly changed many aspects of the legal system. Particularly affected were the great branches 
of the common law, which provided a framework for private ordering. Tort law, previously em-
phasizing the rectification of wrong done against one person by another, became infused with 
notions of strict liability regardless of fault.153 The traditional content of contract law, previously 
content with providing a framework for consensual dealing among individuals, became partially 
supplanted by such vague regulatory doctrines as unconscionability and fair dealing.154 Property 
law was perhaps most vulnerable to change. Unlike contract rights, which are negotiated among 
                                                 
151 See infra, Part II. 
152 For expositions of the increased scope of government since the New Deal, see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Con-
stitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 447-48 (1987) (noting that the New Deal “altered 
the constitutional system in ways so fundamental as to suggest that something akin to a constitutional amend-
ment had taken place”); 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, 44 (1991); JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE PROCESS, passim (1938). 
153 See, e.g., Martin A. Kotler, Reconceptualizing Strict Liability in Tort: An Overview, 50 VAND. L. REV. 555, 
560 (1997) (“today the adoption of an approach that imposes liability regardless of conduct normally repre-
sents an instrumentalist view of tort. Liability is imposed to further some policy unrelated to the parties' behav-
ior. As such, strict liability may be viewed as a cost allocation system intended to achieve various goals, such 
as wealth redistribution, efficiency, autonomy, and so on”) (footnote omitted). 
154 See, e.g., Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202 (Vt. 1984) (articulating the “implied warranty of habitability,” a 
requirement for landlords to keep premises habitable, in fact based on the police power but elaborately based 
on ostensible (but nonwaivable) implications of contract ). 
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individuals and generally binding upon only them and those with whom they are in privity, prop-
erty rights are applicable against the world. In order to be apparent to strangers, property rights 
must possess clear-cut definitions and bright-line boundaries.155
2. Attenuation of Property Rights in Land Use 
Perhaps nowhere has property rights in the United States been so eroded as in the area of 
land use. The basis rights of landowners—to use, to exclude others, and to convey their rights to 
others—all have been under assault.156 In many respects, American real property has become 
governed by a land use regime that, as in contemporary England, recognizes ownership rights 
only in uses to which land is currently put and vests all other development rights in the State.157  
The right of alienation was directly attacked by the federal government in such cases as 
Hodel v. Irving158 and Babbitt v. Youpee,159 in which the Supreme Court struck down repeated 
prohibitions on the transfer at death of fractional interests in land. In a more subtle way, concepts 
such as “reasonable investment backed expectations”160 may diminish the transfer of property 
rights to successors.161 Misplaced equitable doctrines, such as the rule in place in some states 
disqualifying the purchaser of land from seeking a variance on the grounds of “self-imposed 
                                                 
155 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 
(2001) (elaborating the nature and consequences of contract rights being in personam in nature and property 
rights being in rem). 
156 A general example is the revolution in landlord-tenant law, in which the lease, at common law primarily to 
convey an estate in land, has become regarded as a heavily-regulated contract. See generally, Edward H. 
Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 
516 (1984).  
157 See infra notes 241, 242, and associated text. 
158 481 U.S. 704 (1987). 
159 519 U.S. 234 (1997). 
160 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) 
161 In Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001), the Court held that the promulgation of a regulation 
prior to acquisition did not deprive the purchaser of the right to raise a takings claim. Id. at 626-630. However, 
Justice O’Connor, who supplied the fifth vote, added that the Court’s holding “does not mean that the timing 
of the regulation's enactment relative to the acquisition of title is immaterial.” Id. at 633 (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring). 
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hardship” even though the seller would have qualified,162 thus departing from the traditional rule 
that a buyer acquires all of the rights that the seller possessed.163
The right to exclude others, although described by the Supreme Court as “so universally 
held to be a fundamental element of the property right,”164 nevertheless has been abrogated in 
many regulatory contexts, such as prohibitions on discrimination,165 solicitude for low-income 
workers,166 and “expressive” rights for those wanting to mount their soapboxes in private shop-
ping centers.167 These, and similar ways in which the right to exclude others, the classic manifes-
tation168 of the “negative liberty” to be left undisturbed, has been breached to enhance the “posi-
tive liberty” actualizing the goals of some at the expense of others.169
                                                 
162 See, e.g., Clark v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 92 N.E.2d 903, 903 (N.Y. 1950) (declaring “one who thus 
knowingly acquires land for a prohibited use, cannot thereafter have a variance on the ground of ‘special hard-
ship.”).The facts were otherwise egregious, and the court did not explain why plaintiff’s status as a purchaser 
was germane. For elaboration, see Steven J. Eagle, The 1997 Regulatory Takings Quartet: Retreating From the 
“Rule of Law,” 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 345, 363 (1998). 
163 See, e.g., Blackman v. Striker, 37 N.E. 484, 485 (N.Y. 1894) (“The deed must be held to convey all the in-
terest in the lands which the grantor had, unless the intent to pass a less estate or interest appears by express 
terms or be necessarily implied in the terms of the grant.”). 
164 Kaiser Aetna. v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-180 (1979) (“we hold that the ‘right to exclude,’ so uni-
versally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the 
Government cannot take without compensation”). 
165 See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (prohibiting racial discrimina-
tion in public accommodations). 
166 See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (holding farmer’s trespass claims subordinate to right of 
legal services attorneys to make unsolicited visits to farm laborers). 
167 The Supreme Court has held that there is no First Amendment right to expressive activity in private shop-
ping centers. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). However, it subsequently ruled that states may im-
pose private expressive conduct on shopping center owners without violating the owners’ property rights under 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments or free speech rights under the First Amendment. PruneYard Shopping 
Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
168 One famous definition reads: “That is property to which the following label can be attached. To the world: 
Keep off unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold. Signed: Private Citizen. Endorsed: 
The state.” Felix Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954). 
169 See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118 (1969) (discussing positive 
and negative liberty). 
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 Of all types of regulation of property in land, probably the most damaging to the rule of 
law has been the rise of comprehensive regulation of land use. The earliest comprehensive zon-
ing regulation, in New York City in 1916, was instituted at the behest of Fifth Avenue merchants 
desirous of protecting their carriage trade clientele from contact with teeming southern and east-
ern European immigrants working in new high-rise loft factories.170 The articulation of the need 
for zoning, however, was framed in terms of Progressive era expertise. 
The early enthusiasts for zoning . . . were fighting a holy war against the libertarian sins 
of nineteenth-century development . . . . Control over land use would be removed from 
the amoral hand of the market and entrusted to expert elites removed from politics and 
business . . . . 
In part, advocates have sought to downplay the social and political significance of plan-
ning by arguing that planning controls land and other natural resources, not people. But 
the value of resources lies in their social utility, so man and land cannot be so neatly 
separated.171
In 1926, comprehensive zoning received the Supreme Court’s imprimatur in Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company.172 Justice George Sutherland, writing for the Court, framed 
the issue as the validity of zoning restrictions “excluding from residential districts apartment 
houses, business houses, retail stores and shops, and other like establishments.”173 Any nonresi-
dential uses in residential areas, including apartment houses, might result in fire, contagion, or 
disorder.174 Sutherland’s particular bête noire was apartment houses, which he pronounced to 
“come very near to being nuisances.”175 Their presence in single-family house neighborhoods, 
he added, “has sometimes resulted in destroying the entire section for private house purposes 
                                                 
170 See generally, SEYMOUR I. TOLL, ZONED AMERICA (1969). 
171 DENNIS J. COYLE, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION: SHAPING SOCIETY THROUGH LAND USE 
REGULATION 21 (1993). 
172 272 U.S. 365, 379-84 (1926). 
173Id. at 390. 
174 Id. at 392. 
175 Id. at 394-95. This was dicta on a grand scale. Ambler Realty Co. wanted to use its land for heavy industry, 
and its facial attack on zoning in no way implicated single family homes or apartment buildings. 
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[and] very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of 
the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the district.”176
While some recent decisions decry “exclusionary zoning,”177 American land use regula-
tion was at the outset a “less than holy alliance between zoning . . . and anti-immigration senti-
ment.”178 It always has had a substantial class-based component. Indeed, as the trial court’s opin-
ion in Euclid declared, the ultimate purpose of zoning was “to classify the population and segre-
gate them according to their income or situation in life.”179
3. Expansion of the Power of Eminent Domain 
Government entities increasingly have used condemnation for purposes far removed from 
alleviation of blight or the more traditional construction of government buildings and facilities 
used by the public. Eminent domain “has become a marketing tool for governments seeking to 
lure bigger business.”180
In its two seminal cases on what constituted “public use” under the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment,181 the Supreme Court accorded great latitude to localities seeking to condemn 
land for retransfer to private owners. In Berman v. Parker,182 the Court adjudicated the condem-
nation of a sound parcel located within a blighted neighborhood that was undergoing compre-
hensive redevelopment. The Court held that the redevelopment of slums was within the “broad 
                                                 
176Id. at 394. 
177 See, e.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975) 
(imposing obligation to provide fair-share of regional low- and moderate-income housing needs on developing 
municipalities). 
178Michael Allan Wolf, The Prescience and Centrality of Euclid v. Ambler, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN 
DREAM 252, 257 (Charles M. Harr & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989). 
179Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid, 297 F. 307, 316 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev’d, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).  
180 Dean Starkman, Condemnation Is Used to Hand One Business Property of Another, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 
1998, at A1. 
181 U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”). 
182 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
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and inclusive” concept of public welfare.183 “Once the question of the public purpose has been 
decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular 
tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.”184 Further-
more, “community redevelopment programs need not, by force of the Constitution, be on a 
piecemeal basis—lot by lot, building by building.”185 In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,186 
the Court similarly upheld the condemnation of freehold interests for transfer to the respective 
ground lessees for the purpose of “reduc[ing] the perceived social and economic evils of a land 
oligopoly traceable to their monarchs.”187
Both cases effusively deferred to legislative determinations. Berman declared that 
“[s]ubject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public inter-
est has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”188 Midkiff added, rather confusingly, that 
the Public Use Clause is “coterminous” with the police power.189 More generally, the Court, in 
both cases, distinguished the incidental private gain that would result from condemnation and 
                                                 
183 Id. at 33. 
184 Id. at 34. 
185 Id. at 35. “The entire area needed redesigning so that a balanced, integrated plan could be developed for the 
region, including not only new homes but also schools, churches, parks, streets, and shopping centers. In this 
way it was hoped that the cycle of decay of the area could be controlled and the birth of future slums pre-
vented.” Id. at 34-35. 
186 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984). 
187 Id. at 241-42. The Court noted findings that the State and Federal Governments owned almost 49% of the 
State’s land and that another 47% was in the hands of only 72 private landowners. Id. at 232. 
188 Berman, 348 U.S. at 32. 
189 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240. “This pronouncement has dismayed commentators because the outer limit of the 
police power has traditionally marked the line between noncompensable regulation and compensable takings 
of property, not the line between compensable takings and the area where the constitution bars government 
from engaging in any sort of exchange whatever. Legitimately exercised, the police power requires no com-
pensation. Thus, if public use is truly coterminous with the police power, a state could freely choose between 
compensation and noncompensation any time its actions served a ‘public use.’ This approach would seemingly 
overrule the entire takings doctrine in a single stroke.” Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 
CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986) 
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retransfer to achieve a valid public purpose from the “purely private taking [that] would serve no 
legitimate purpose of government and would thus be void.190
Even in areas where the permissibility of condemnation for retransfer clearly is estab-
lished, the inherent vagueness of definitions gives rise to the possibility of abuse. In Concerned 
Citizens of Princeton, Inc. v. Mayor and Council of Borough of Princeton,191 for instance, a New 
Jersey appellate court recently determined that the designation of an “area in need of redevelop-
ment” (i.e., a blighted area) could be premised on functional obsolescence. The “faulty design” 
in question was that of a municipal parking lot in an affluent community that was condemned by 
the borough in which it was located. The borough sought to ease parking problems in downtown 
Princeton and deemed the lot ill-configured. Likewise, in City of Norwood v. Horney,192 a mu-
nicipality had designated a formerly all-residential neighborhood that more recently had some 
commercial development as “deteriorating,” so that homes could be condemnation for an addi-
tional commercial project.193 The city code defined a “deteriorating” area as  
An area, whether predominantly built up or open, which is not a slum, blighted or dete-
riorated area, but which because of incompatible land uses, nonconforming uses, lack of 
adequate facilities, faulty street arrangement, obsolete platting, inadequate community 
and public utilities, diversity of ownership, tax delinquency, increased density of popula-
tion without commensurate increases in new residential buildings and community facili-
ties, high turnover in residential or commercial occupancy, lack of maintenance and re-
pair of buildings, or any combination thereof, is detrimental to the public health, safety, 
morals and general welfare, and which will deteriorate or is in danger of deteriorating, 
into a blighted area.194
Under this definition, a slippery slope is created by which neighborhoods deemed ripe for 
conversion by developers are determined to be less-than-ideal by local officials, hence in danger 
of becoming blighted, and thus treated as if they were blighted. Under these elastic standards, the 
                                                 
190 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245. See also, Berman, 348 U.S. at 33-34 (“[t]he public end may be as well or better 
served through an agency of private enterprise than through a department of government”).  
191 851 A.2d 685 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004). 
192 830 N.E.2d 381. (Ohio. App. 2005). 
193 Id. at 384-85. 
194 Id. at 388. 
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appellate court in Horney found that the city had not abused its discretion.195 The Supreme Court 
of Ohio recently granted review.196
A glaring example of the pretextual invocation of “blight” was 99 Cents Only Stores v. 
Lancaster Redevelopment Agency,197 where a “big-box” retailer important to local redevelop-
ment efforts leaned on the city to condemn a competitor’s store for retransfer to it. Also, in 
Aaron v. Target Corp.,198 in which a large retailer, desirous of expanding a successful store, cir-
cumvented negotiating with its landlord by paying for a blight study that found minor problems 
which, in fact, were the retailer’s responsibility under the lease. Furthermore, the retailer had 
process served upon itself as agent for the landlord, which learned of the condemnation too 
late.199 The U.S. district court declared Aaron to be “one of the rare cases in which possible ‘bad 
faith, harassment, or some extraordinary circumstance’ makes abstention inappropriate.”200 On 
this point it was reversed, with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit holding that the 
trial court should have exercised Younger abstention.201
In Southwestern Illinois Development Authority v. National City Environmental, 
L.L.C.,202 the Supreme Court of Illinois found that the redeveloping agency condemning the 
landowner’s parcel did not undertake an independent study or formulate a comprehensive plan, 
but instead “advertised that, for a fee, it would condemn land at the request of ‘private develop-
                                                 
195 Id. at 387. 
196 828 N.E.2d 115 (May 25, 2005) (table). 
197 237 F. Supp. 2d 1123 (C.D. Cal. 2001), dismissed, 60 Fed. Appx. 123, 2003 WL 932421 (9th Cir. 2003). 
198 269 F. Supp. 2d 1162 (E.D. Mo. 2003). 
199 Id.  
200 Id. at 1172 (quoting Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 437 
(1982)). 
201 Aaron v. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting that, although condemnation proceedings were 
not commenced in state court until almost two weeks after federal injunctive relief was sought, steps proceed-
ing formal condemnation had been well underway.) See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (holding that 
federal courts should abstain from exercising jurisdiction in cases where equitable relief would interfere with 
pending state proceedings in a way that offends principles of comity and federalism).
202 768 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2002). 
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ers’ for the ‘private use’ of developers.”203 The court concluded that the agency’s “true inten-
tions were to act as a default broker of land.”204
A case raising the generic economic condemnation issue perhaps most starkly is Cotton-
wood Christian Center v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency.205 There, the locality desired to obtain 
sales tax revenues that would flow from a “big-box” store to be located on the church’s large, 
commercially-zoned lot fronting a main road, instead of the large auditorium and ministry build-
ings that the plaintiff had planned for. The city denied the church’s development application and 
its redevelopment agency instituted condemnation proceedings on the grounds of ostensibly 
blight. Given the nature of the landowner’s intended use, the court applied heightened scrutiny to 
the denial under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,206 as opposed 
to rational basis review. The court quoted 99 Cents Only Stores’ observation that the “condemna-
tion efforts rest on nothing more than the desire to achieve the naked transfer of property from 
one private party to another,” and added “[t]hat appears to be the case here.”207 “The court’s 
skepticism of the city’s explanations provides support that courts are becoming increasingly 
critical of public use justifications.”208
A very significant response to condemnation abuse was the Michigan Supreme Court’s 
2004 decision in County of Wayne v. Hathcock.209 The court abrogated its seminal, well known, 
and very deferential Poletown doctrine,210 under which an entire ethnic neighborhood had been 
leveled for construction of a new General Motors assembly plant. Hathcock reviewed the history 
of the term “public use” under the Michigan constitutions, and concluded that “the transfer of 
                                                 
203 Id. at 10. 
204 Id. at 10. 
205 218 F. Supp. 2d 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
206 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2.  
207 218 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (quoting 99 Cents, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 1129). 
208 Jennifer J. Kruckeberg, Note, Can Government Buy Everything?: The Takings Clause and the Erosion of 
the “Public Use’ Requirement,” 87 MINN. L. REV. 543, 554 (2002). 
209 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004). 
210 Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981). 
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condemned property is a ‘pubic use’ when it possesses one of the three characteristics in our pre-
1963 case law identified by Justice Ryan” in his Poletown dissent: 
First, condemnations in which private land was constitutionally transferred by the con-
demning authority to a private entity involved “public necessity of the extreme sort oth-
erwise impracticable.”211
* * * 
Second, this Court has found that the transfer of condemned property to a private entity is 
consistent with the constitution's “public use” requirement when the private entity re-
mains accountable to the public in its use of that property.212
* * * 
Finally, condemned land may be transferred to a private entity when the selection of the 
land to be condemned is itself based on public concern. In Justice Ryan's words, the 
property must be selected on the basis of “facts of independent public significance,” 
meaning that the underlying purposes for resorting to condemnation, rather than the sub-
sequent use of condemned land, must satisfy the Constitution's public use requirement.213
The first of these tests would seem to cover railways, pipelines, and other uses where 
holdouts could stymie acquisition of an unbroken right of way. The third test would cover elimi-
nation of blight, which would occur prior to the land’s redevelopment. The troublesome aspect of 
the second test, remaining accountability, is that it will have a tendency to involve the State more 
closely with private enterprise. While real covenants designating broadly appropriate uses of 
land would prevent some abuse, the need of ongoing business for flexibility in their operations 
would make public bodies more their business partners than their regulators. 
4. The Supreme Court Endorses Condemnation for Private Redevelopment in Kelo. 
In Kelo v. City of New London,214 the Supreme Court recently explicated the Fifth 
Amendment’s Public Use Clause.215 In a 5-4 decision, it upheld the condemnation of private 
homes in a non-blighted neighborhood for the purpose of private economic redevelopment of a 
distressed community. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the Court, asserted that “public pur-
                                                 
211 Id. at 781 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J. dissenting)).  
212 Id. at 782 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 479 (Ryan, J. dissenting)). 
213 Id. at 782-783 (quoting Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Ryan, J. dissenting)). 
214 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). 
215 U.S. CONST., amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”). 
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pose” has morphed to subsume “public use,”216 and that the revitalization project, which would 
create offices, shops, and high-end housing adjacent to the Pfizer Corporation’s new world re-
search center, served a public purpose.217 Justice O’Connor’s principal dissent complained that, 
in both Berman and Midkiff, “the extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property 
inflicted affirmative harm on society.”218 In contrast, Kelo “holds that the sovereign may take 
private property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary private 
use, so long as the new use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the public—such 
as increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even aesthetic pleasure.”219 Furthermore, “[t]he 
specter of condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing 
any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm with a factory.”220
A concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, whose vote was necessary to Justice Stevens’ 
majority, stressed that heightened scrutiny would be required in judging condemnations for re-
transfer to other private parties under some unspecified circumstances.221 In any event, however, 
the presence or absence of a comprehensive redevelopment plan or explicit quid pro quo involv-
ing the redeveloper is essentially irrelevant. The success of attempts to lure desirable new com-
mercial activity to a city largely is a function of its reputation in pleasing firms that previously 
relocated there.222 As Justice O’Connor noted, in economic development takings, “private bene-
fit and incidental public benefit are, by definition, merged and mutually reinforcing. In this case, 
                                                 
216 Id. at 2662 (asserting that “while many state courts in the mid-19th century endorsed ‘use by the public’ as 
the proper definition of public use, that narrow view steadily eroded over time.”). 
217 Id. at 2665. 
218 Id. at 2662 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that Berman involved urban blight and Midkiff oligopoly). 
219 Id. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
220 Id. at 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
221 Id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing, inter alia, Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 
432, 446-447, 450 (1985)). 
222 See Steven J. Eagle, “Kelo v. City of New London: A Tale of Pragmatism Betrayed,” in EMINENT DOMAIN 
USE AND ABUSE: KELO IN CONTEXT (Dwight Merriam & Mary Massaron Ross, eds. forthcoming, 2005).   
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for example, any boon for Pfizer or the plan’s developer is difficult to disaggregate from the 
promised public gains in taxes and jobs.”223
While Justice Stevens acknowledged such “aberrations” as 99 Cents Only Stores, it was 
in the context of noting that the Court would confront potential abuses “if and when they 
arise.”224 Given that the Supreme Court did not hear a public use case during the 20 years pre-
ceding Kelo, and that it might hear perhaps one takings case per year of any type, it is unlikely 
that the Court will exercise direct supervision. Furthermore, its holdings make review of state or 
local regulatory takings cases by lower federal courts most improbable, as well.225
Even if a private enterprise is designated as the recipient of a post-condemnation retrans-
fer, it has no assurance of retaining its new estate. In what might seem to the original landowner 
an act of poetic justice, the locality might condemn the interest a second time and transfer it to a 
different private developer. In that case, the cry of the first developer that its interest is inviolate 
because the transfer to it had been determined to be in the public interest is of no avail.226 The 
upshot is that private redevelopers, as much as cities, must engage in eternal market-based court-
ship of those with the power to affect their destinies. 
5. Smart Growth 
Although many urbanites find it de rigueur to condemn suburban living and “sprawl,” 
“Americans have a strong preference for detached single-family homes on relatively large lots, 
whether a log cabin in the woods, a garden cottage in the suburbs, or a four thousand square foot 
                                                 
223 125 S.Ct. at 2675-76. 
224 2667 & n.17. 
225 See Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (positing need for 
property owner to litigate for compensation through state courts before claim “ripe” for federal judicial re-
view); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 125 S.Ct. 2491 (2005) (holding that full faith 
and credit act precludes federal court review of issues determined in state ripening litigation). In San Remo, 
four justices noted that the Williamson County “state litigation” requirement should be reconsidered. 125 S.Ct. 
at 2508 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment). 
226 See Kaufmann's Carousel, Inc. v. City of Syracuse, 750 N.Y.S.2d 212, 221 (App. Div. 2002) (finding “no 
merit” to the contention that “the power to condemn does not extend to property that is already devoted to a 
public purpose”). 
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“McMansion’ on an acre of land . . . .”227 Furthermore, given the cost of land and building mate-
rials, “[f]ar more Americans than Europeans can afford this form of low-density housing.”228
“Sprawl” is the ogre of land use and urban policy at the turn of the new century. While 
fostering suburbia was once a guiding principle, suburban “sprawl” is now blamed for a 
spectrum of harms, from environmental disasters such as the depletion of wilderness and 
the pollution of water, to urban maladies such as the creation of the ethnic underclass and 
the prostration of city governments. Without too much exaggeration, there would seem to 
be no greater issue of social policy . . . .229
As a “solution” to the sprawl problem, experts have proposed “smart growth,” the tools 
of which include “use restrictions, environmental requirements, economic incentives, conditional 
demands, and regulatory mechanisms to secure participation by landowners and developers in 
combating urban sprawl.”230 The American Planning Association’s “Policy Guide on Smart 
Growth” recently stated as a “core principle” that “[e]very level of government - federal, state, 
regional, county, and local – should identify policies and practices that are inconsistent with 
Smart Growth and develop new policies and practices that support Smart Growth. 231 The APA 
also calls for statewide planning,232 and the number of “smart growth” statutes in place has in-
creased dramatically. Hawaii, Vermont, Florida, and Oregon were the first states to implement 
                                                 
227 Edward H. Ziegler, Urban Sprawl, Growth Management and Sustainable Development in the United 
States: Thoughts on the Sentimental Quest for a New Middle Landscape, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 26, 32 
(2003). 
228 Id. 
229 Paul J. Boudreaux, Looking the Ogre in the Eye: Ten Tough Questions for the Antisprawl Movement, 14 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 171 (2000). 
230 James E. Holloway & Donald C. Guy, Smart Growth and Limits on Government Powers: Effecting Nature, 
Markets, and the Quality of Life Under the Takings Clause and Other Provisions, 9 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 421, 455-456 (2001). 
231 AMERICAN PLANNING ASSOCIATION, POLICY GUIDE ON SMART GROWTH 2 (April 15, 2004) (hereinafter 
“APA POLICY GUIDE”) (last visited on March 8, 2005) 
<http://www.planning.org/policyguides/smartgrowth.htm>. 
232 Id. (Policy 5). 
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planning on a statewide basis during the 1960s and ‘70s.233Other states adopting statewide plan-
ning initiatives since include New Jersey, Washington, Maryland, California and Florida.234
It is too early to tell the ultimate impact of the “smart growth” movement. However, it is 
very likely that such measures as the urban growth boundary system in Portland, Oregon, do re-
sult in higher prices.235 Voters in Oregon attempted to amend the state constitution to protect pri-
vate property rights,236 and subsequently did so by statutory initiative.237 The State’s stringent 
land use controls played a critical role in their actions.238
A recent study of the housing markets in more than 300 American cities since 1950 notes 
that, since 1970, the primary cause of increase in housing prices appears to be “a significant in-
crease in the ability of local residents to block new projects and a change of cities from urban 
                                                 
233 See DAVID L. CALLIES, ROBERT H. FREILICH & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND 
USE 610 (3rd ed. 1999). 
234 For brief summaries of these and other statutes, see ROBERT H. FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART 
GROWTH: SUCCESSFUL LEGAL, PLANNING, AND ENVIRONMENTAL SYSTEMS 209-252 (1999). 
235 See William A. Fischel, Comment on Anthony Downs’s ‘Have Housing Prices Risen Faster in Portland 
Than Elsewhere?’, 13 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 43, 44 (2002), available at 
http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_1301_fischel.pdf (last visited March 8, 2005). 
236 In November 2000, the voters of Oregon passed “Initiative Measure 7,” provided that the state or a political 
subdivision must pay just compensation equal to the full reduction in value caused by the enforcement of a 
regulation that adopted after the owner has purchased the private real property in question. The Amendment 
was invalidated under the state’s “one subject” rule. League of Oregon Cities v. State, 56 P.3d 892 (Or. 2002). 
237 See Oregon Secretary of State, Measure 37, at http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov22004/guide/meas/ 
m37_text.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2005). 
238 See Sara C. Galvan, Comment, Gone Too Far: Oregon’s Measure 37 and the Perils of Over-Regulating 
Land Use, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 587 (2005). Compare, Edward J. Sullivan, Commentary, Oregon’s 
Measure 37: Crisis and Opportunity for Planning, 57 PLANNING & ENVTL. L. No. 3 at 3, 3 (Mar. 2005) (at-
tributing passage to “clever political stroke”). 
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growth machines to homeowners’ cooperatives.”239 A related study of housing prices in Manhat-
tan also indicates that supply restrictions lead to high prices.240
More important, “smart growth” inevitably would pull the United States closer to the pre-
sent English system, where the right to develop land was “severely impacted” by the Town and 
Country Planning Act of 1947.241 The law vested all rights, other than those to which the land 
was currently being put, in the State. It “did not nationalise the land; what it did do was to na-
tionalise the development value in land.”242
C. Creative Recognition of Private Property Rights 
Even where the amount of a resource available for use has to be capped, there is no rea-
son why fractional shares could not be distributed to the affected landowners. In nations with a 
rough transition to the rule of law and a market economy mistrust of government might make 
this not work too well.243 In the United States, such an approach was adopted by the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Barancik v. County of Marin.244 That case concerned the 
sparsely developed Nicasio Valley, a rugged and beautiful area in Northern California. Rather 
than zoning individual parcels for development at commercially infeasible levels or limiting de-
velopment to landowners elsewhere who were awarded “transfer development rights” in mitiga-
tion of stringent restrictions on land use on their own parcels that might otherwise constitute tak-
                                                 
239 Edward L. Glaeser, et al., Why Have Housing Prices Gone Up?, Harvard Institute of Economic Research 
Discussion Paper 2061 (2005), available at <http://post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/2005papers/2005list.html> 
(forthcoming in the AMER. ECON. REV.). 
240 Edward L. Glaeser, et al., Why is Manhattan So Expensive? Regulation and the Rise in House Prices, Natl. 
Bur. Econ. Res. Working Paper No. W10124 (2003), available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=471474> (last vis-
ited March 8, 2005). 
241 Shelley Ross Saxer, Planning Gain, Exactions, and Impact Fees: A Comparative Study of Planning Law in 
England, Wales, and the United States, 32 URB. LAW. 21, 37 (2000). 
242 Id. at 37 n.98 (quoting SIR DESMOND HEAP, AN OUTLINE OF PLANNING LAW 14 (11th ed. 1996)). 
243 See, e.g., Yuliya Mitrofanskaya, Privatization as an International Phenomenon: Kazakhstan, 14 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 1933, 1415 (1999) (noting that Russian citizens often sold their tradable share certificates in 
newly denationalized industries for a pittance, partly because of mistrust of subsequent government policies).  
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ings,245 to award individual landowners There the county provided for “Transfer of Development 
Rights” in the that still was sparsely developed. The plan treated what the court later termed the 
“homogeneous community of Nicasio Valley,” as “one complete land forum, one large property 
to be sensitively planned.” Ranchers in the valley were permitted to sell to other property owners 
in the valley the right to develop within the regulations of the community. A purchaser could ac-
cumulate more than one development right.246
One impetus for recognition of such rights in the future is the disquiet that some Supreme 
Court justices have expressed in Kelo v. City of New London247 regarding the failure of landown-
ers whose land has been taken for private revitalization to receive any of the great additional 
value that inures when small parcels are assembled into one larger parcel.248
IV. CONCLUSION 
Both United States Government agencies and private organizations have been working to 
acquaint Eastern European nations with the flexibility and other advantages of private property 
rights, creative preservation of those rights at home in America would offer similar advantages. 
However, court decisions in the United States have undermined the private property rights of 
American citizens at home. 
                                                 
245 See Fred F. French Investing Co., Inc. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381, 383 (N.Y. 1976) (approving 
TDRs in theory, although striking down the statute at bar as requiring landowners to accept TDRs with market 
values too uncertain and contingent to comport with due process). Compare, R. S. Radford, Takings and 
Transferable Development Rights in the Supreme Court: The Constitutional Status of TDRs in the Aftermath of 
Suitum, 28 STETSON L. REV. 685 (1999) (expressing concern that TDRs may be used as device to circumvent 
liability for regulatory takings). 
246 Id. at 835.  
247 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). 
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transcript of oral argument, 2005 WL 529436 (Feb. 22, 2005). Justice Kennedy asked petitioner’s counsel 
whether there was legal scholarship pertaining to whether the Court ought “to adjust the measure of compensa-
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B.” Id. at *15-16. 
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As Justice O’Connor ended her Kelo dissent: “As for the victims, the government now 
has license to transfer property from those with fewer resources to those with more. The Foun-
ders cannot have intended this perverse result.  ‘[T]hat alone is a just government," wrote James 
Madison, "which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.’"249
                                                 
249 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S.Ct. 2655, 2677 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting James Madi-
son, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, (Mar. 29, 1792), reprinted in 14 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 (R. Rutland 
et al. eds.1983). 
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